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This Article is a paean to the potential, and to some degree actual,
contributions ofthe doctrine of low value speech. Although hepraises the
abstract concept, Professor Loewy laments the inconsistent use and even
misuse of the doctrine. He then suggests a methodologyfor capturing the
virtues of low value speech, while eliminating its vices.
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I. Introduction
Prior to the last quarter of the twentieth century, there was no such thing
as low value speech. Speech was either protected speech (which we might
call high value speech) or unprotected speech (which we might call no value
speech). The concept of something in between Qow value speech) was for-
eign to ourjurisprudence. The following three example cases from the 1940s
and 1950s illustrate the point.
The first case, Valentine v. Chrestensen' involved a statute forbidding
the distribution of only commercial handbills.' A submarine exhibitor who
sought to distribute leaflets advertising the exhibition challenged the statute.3
In an incredibly cavalier opinion, a unanimous Supreme Court dismissed the
plaintiff's claims:'
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the
exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately
regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not undulyburden or
prosc'be its employment in these public thoroughfares. We are equally
clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respectspurely commercial advertising... Ifthe respondentwas attempt-
ing to use the streets of New York by distributing commercial advertising,
the prohibition of the code provision was lawfully invoked against his
conduct
5
So, by a simple ipse dixit, commercial speech became nonspeech or, at least,
no value speech.
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 n.1 (1942) (specifically exempting
noncommercial handbills). The distribution of noncommercial handbills is, of course, constitu-
tionally protected. Schneider v. State (Town of Ixvington), 308 U.S. 147,160 (1939); see infra
notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing Schneider).
3. Valentine,316 U.S. at54. The case was slightly more complex than that because the
exhibitor, after being warned not to distribute the commercial advertising, distributed a two-
faced leaflet (one side with advertising and the other side with a political protest). Id. at 53.
The police commissioner informed the exhibitor that the political protest, if exhibited alone,
would not subject him to prosecution, but that if he exhibited the two-faced handbill, he would
be prosecuted. Id. The Court quite reasonably concluded that if the distribution of commercial
handbills could be punished, so could the distribution of this two-sided handbill. Id. at 55.
4. For a considerably more sophisticated analysis of the problem, see the opinion of the
District Court, 34 F. Supp. 596, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (finding that ordinance prohibiting
distribution of handbills was unconstitutional), and see generally the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Court ofAppeals, 122 F. 2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941).
5. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54-55 (emphasis added).
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Just six years later, in Winters v. New York,6 the Court faced another New
York claim that the government should not protect less valued speech.7 This
time, New York argued that the First Amendment should not protect entertain-
ment." Or, the state argued, at least the Court should deny such protection to
magazines that are "collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust. .. 'so
massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against
the person. . "...,19 The Court answered that argument with the following:
We do not accedeto appellee's suggestionthattheconstitutionalprotection
for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between
the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection ofthat
basic right Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through
fiction. Whatisoneman's amusementteaches another's doctrine. Though
we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection offree speech as the best of
literature.10
In contrast to the Valentine Court's treatment of commercial speech as no
value speech, the Winters Court held violent magazines (in which it could see
no possible value) to the same high value that it holds political speech or the
best of literature." Yet, in the very next sentence, it suggested that the maga-
zines "are equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent, obscene, or
profane.'12 That suggestionbecamethe rule nine years later in Roth v. United
States.'3
In Roth, the Court refused to protect obscenity because the material was
"utterly without redeeming social importance."14 This was a strange rationale
for a Court that had held, in Winters, that the absence of any possible value in
a bloody violent magazine was no reason to deny it constitutional protection."
6. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
7. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,518-20 (1948).
8. Id. at 510.
9. Id. at 513.
10. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
11. This holding caused Justice Frankfurter to protest that the decision "gives publications
which have 'nothing of any possible value to society' constitutional protection but denies to the
States the power to prevent the great evils to which, in their rational judgment, such publica-
tions give rise." Id. at 528 (Frankfirter, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 510.
13. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484-85 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not
constitutionally protected speech).
15. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (describing First Amendment protection
of violent magazines that supposedly add no value to society).
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There may be good reason to cabin material depicting excesses in both vio-
lence or sex, but it is not intuitively nor empirically obvious that cabining
material depicting sexual excesses is more important than cabining material
depicting excess violence. 6 Yet, under Winters and Roth, a state could do
nothing to cabin excessively violent material, but it could outright forbid
excessively sexual material. 7
Because no "low value" speech category existed, neither excessively
violent nor excessively sexual material could be placed in it. Consequently,
the Court had to choose between "high value" or "no value." In sum, the
Court deemed excessively violent material speech (high value), yet deemed
excessively sexual material obscenity (no value).
In 1976, the concept of low value speech was born in two cases decided
only a month apart. In the first case, Virginia State Board ofPharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"5 the Court rejected Valentine, holding
that pure commercial speech is entitled to at least a modicum of First Amend-
ment protection. 9 At the same time, in a footnote of all places, the Court
adumbrated the concept of low value speech:
In concludingthat commercial speechenjoys First Amendmentprotection,
we have not heldthatitis whollyundifferentiable from otherforms. There
are commonsense differences between speech that does no more than pro-
pose a commercialtransaction, and othervarieties. Even ifthe differences
do notjustify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus
subjectto complete suppressionby the State, they nevertheless suggest that
a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired."
Thus, the concept of low value speech was born of compromise. Rather than
treat commercial speech as no value speech, as the Valentine Court had done,
or treat it as full value speech as the Winters Court had done with violent
magazines, the Court instead reasoned that commercial speech is entitled to
some, but not necessarily all, of the protections afforded full value speech.2
16. See generally Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to
the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107 (1994) (comparing legal censorship
history of sexually explicit obscenity and violent materials, and investigating policy reasons
behind distinction).
17. Of course, excessively sexual material is not an exact synonym for obscenity, but for
the current point it will suffice.
18. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
19. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770-73 (1976).
20. Id. at 771-72 n.24 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at770.
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The Court continued the low value speech concept a month later in Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.' In Young, the Court held that a zoning
regulation applicable to certain sexually explicit movies theaters, and not ap-
plicable to other movie theaters, did not violate the First Amendment rights of
the affected theater owners.3 Four ofthe Justices (Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist,
and White) went to great lengths to hold that sexually explicit speech was
lower value speech and, as such, could be treated less favorably than higher
value speech.24 Although Justice Powell, who cast the fifth vote upholding the
statute, purported to question the concept of low value speech,' he joined in
the plurality's observation that "there is surely a less vital interest in the
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornogra-
phy and artistic expression than inthe free dissemination of ideas of social and
political significance."' Whatever ambiguity may inhere in Young, it is clear
from its progeny that the Court currently views sexually explicit non-obscene
speech as low valueY
ff. The Value of Low Value Speech
Value, of course, is in the eye ofthe beholder. Neither a state seeking to
regulate ideas, nor a speaker seeking to disseminate ideas, can be completely
happy with the concept of low value speech. From a state's perspective,
treating the utterance as low value speech is not as helpful as treating it as
nonspeech (or no value) as in Valentine or Roth. Under those decisions, states
can regulate nonspeech using merely rationality or conjecture.' From a
22. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
23. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-69 (1976).
24. See id. at 63-73 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 61. (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
27. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277, 288-89 (2000) (upholding statute pro-
hibiting nude live entertainment because statute provided "content-neutral restrictions on sym-
bolic speech"). The four Justice plurality opinion (Brayer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy)
concluded that "nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think
that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection." Id. at 289 (citing
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-566 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opin-
ion)). Justice Souter, concurring in part, suggested that statutes regulating nude dancing should
be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 313 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (commercial speech case)).
28. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (explaining constitutionality of prohibi-
tion on commercial communications in Valentine); supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text
(examining denial of First Amendment protection for obscenity in Roth). For an illustration
of how little of a showing satisfies substantive due process scrutiny, see Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (stating that courts do not substitute own judgment for that of legis-
lature).
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speaker's perspective, low value speech is less acceptable than high value
speech (such as that in Winters) because low value speech can be regulated in
ways that high value speech cannot.
Whether government legislation or speech is the winner in a low value
speech regime depends on the default position. If in the absence of a low
value speech category the questioned speech would be treated as high value
speech, low value speech aids the government. But, if in the absence of such
a category the speech would be treated as having no value, low value speech
actually advances the free speech claim. In fact, the default position varies.
Before commercial speech was granted low value status, it was treated as
valueless.' However, sexually explicit non-obscene speech enjoyed full First
Amendment protection before the Court recognized it as low value.3"
Intuitively, one thinks of low value speech as a mid or neutral point with
each side getting half of what it wants. But that need not be the case. Law is
not a zero sum game. Ifthe speaker is allowed to convey her message, and the
listener allowed to hear it, the bulk of the free speech claim has been satisfied.
Conversely, if the government operates under a different set of rules for low
value speech without significantly impacting that speech, the government's
interest may have been substantially satisfied. Thus, low value speech at least
has the potential to give both government and speakers far more than half of
what each seeks. Such a prospect should not be dismissed lightly.
This Article will explore ways in which the concept of low value speech
has been and can be employed to achieve the twin goals of protecting the
conveyance of ideas while simultaneously allowing regulation that would be
inappropriate for high value speech. It will also examine missed opportunities
for invoking low value speech, as well as misuses of low value speech result-
ing in actual suppression of the speech. Finally, this Article will conclude
with suggestions for expanded use of the low value speech concept.
Before turning to the specific values of low value commercial speech and
low value sexually explicit speech, I will evaluate two arguments suggesting
that the entire process of distinguishing between low and high value speech
is flawed. First, some argue that it is inherently wrong to treat some speech
29. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52,54 (1942) (holding that FirstAmendment
protection does not apply to commercial handbills); supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text
(discussing Valentine).
30. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (invalidating
ordinance prohibiting films with nudity visible outside of drive-in theater); Southeastern Pro-
motions v. Conrad, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (finding that denial of use of municipal
facility for production of musical Hair violated First Amendment). Cf. Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507,510 (1948) (protecting violence in magazines under First Amendment despite fact
that Court found no redeeming value in material); supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text
(discussing Winters).
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less favorably than other speech purely on the basis of content." The second
argument is that the line between low value and high value speech is too
difficult to draw.32
The first argument is the spiritual descendent of Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley,33 in which the Court held that one cannot be denied the
opportunity to protest because ofthe content ofhis message.34 Mosley carried
a picket sign within 150 feet of a high school, in protest of that high school's
segregation. 5 The Court assumed arguendo (and arguably incorrectly) 6 that
a general prohibition on picketing in front of the school would have been
permissible, but upheld Mosley's claim on the ground that labor picketing was
permissible. 7 In the most absolute terms possible, the Court declared that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.1
38
Of course, the Mosley Court was referring to high value speech. Nobody
doubted that government could distinguish between classes of high value
speech (school segregation protest or labor protest) and no value speech
(obscenity) based on content. What government could not do was discrimi-
nate based on content within classes of high value speech.39 The question of
whether there could be a category of low value speech distinguishable from
both high value speech and no value speech simply was not before the Court.
Nor is there any logical reason why a Court that denies any protection to some
forms of speech could not deny partial protection to others. Put differently,
it is not obvious that if the courts eliminate low value speech, the default
position would be high value speech.
31. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who 'sAfraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. RLv. 627 (1990) (arguing that distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech is illogical).
32. See generally Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989)
(detailing problems associated with categorizing speech).
33. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
34. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972).
35. Id. at 92-93.
36. In a companion case, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court
strongly suggested that streets could not be off-limits for protest unless the protest was inconsis-
tent with the use of the area. Id. at 20-23. It is highly unlikely that one solitary, silent picketer
within 150 feet of a school would have disrupted the school. Cf United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171,184 (1983) (upholding right to protest in front of Supreme Court).
37. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99-100.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 100-01.
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The argument that it is too difficult to distinguish between high and low
value speech is similarly flawed. Anybody who has ever tried an obscenity
case knows that the line between protected and unprotected speech is ephem-
eral at best.40 Adding a middle category does not make the line-drawing more
difficult. Rather, it simply reduces the consequences of a mistake. For exam-
ple, under the Valentine regime, if a Court found a particular leaflet to be
commercial speech, it would grant that leaflet no protection at all.4 The line
would still have to be drawn. Under the low value regime, the same line has
to be drawn, but the consequences of a mistake are less. If the low value line
is drawn incorrectly, the speech gets less protection. However, less protection
is better than no protection at all.
HI The Proper Use ofLow Value Speech
A. Commercial Speech
1. Truthfil and Not Misleading
Because commercial speech is low value speech, the government can
demand that the speech be "truthful and not misleading."'42 Although, this
limitation does not trouble the Court or most commentators,43 it is flatly con-
trary to the rule for high value speech in several ways.
First, as the Court in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van' instructs us, the First Amendment must protect speech that is factually
false in order to provide breathing room for truthffl speech.4' However, courts
40. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing hypothetical scenario).
41. Indeed, because the handbill in Valentine was two-sided (one side commercial, the
other side political), the plaintiff argued that his speech should be treated as political. Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942). The Court of Appeals found this point persuasive.
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1941).
42. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557,566
(1980) (reasoning that commercial speech must first relate to lawful business and also not
mislead in order to deserve First Amendment protection); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 372-73 (1977) (providing First Amendment protection for legal advertisement in part
because it was not misleading); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748,771-73 (1976) (discussed supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text).
43. See Vincent Blasi & Henry Paul Monaghan, The FirstAmendment and Cigarette Ad-
vertising, 256 JAMA 502, 504-06 (1986) (arguing constitutionality of ban on tobacco advertis-
ing); see also Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theory, 74 NW. U.
L. REV. 372,386-98 (1979) (exploring commercial speech as separate class warranting separate
analysis). But see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 31, at 635-37 (questioning distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech).
44. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
45. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (highlighting potential
chilling effect of stricter rule). Sullivan is not predicated on any affirmative value of false
factual speech. Rather, it is predicated on the belief that if all falsehoods are punishable, news-
papers may be reluctant to print what they believe to be a true story out of fear that, in some
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do not afford commercial speech that same breathing room because courts
consider commercial speech to have a lower value. In this respect, the rule for
commercial speech is a compromise. Requiring commercial speechto betrath-
ful, while simultaneously not forbidding it, is a classic example of giving each
side most ofwhat it wants. The government can forbid false advertising, surely
an important interest. At the same time, advertisers still can present their
products to the public as long as they do so in a truthful way.
46
The "no misleading advertising" rule permits the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to require certain products to disclose their limitations as well as their
scope - their negatives as well as their positives. In fact, one can hardly watch
an evening of commercial television without hearing some wonder drug extol
its virtues while whispering its potential pitfalls.Y7 If commercial speech were
instead high value, this kind of compelled speech would run afoul of at least
two clearly settled rules. First, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo" clearly held that the government cannot constitutionally compel a
particular, it will later be determined to be false. Id. at 266. Justice Brennan, the author of the
Sullivan majority, emphasized this concern in Geriz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
in which he wrote:
We recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that a rule requiring a critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual contentions would inevit-
ably lead to self-censorship when publishers, fearfi of being unable to prove truth
or unable to bear the expense of attempting to do so, simply eschewed printing con-
troversial articles.
Id. at 365-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In that regard, Sullivan acts as a prophylactic rule, not
all that unlike Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (enumerating constitutionally
required warning that must be given to suspect prior to interrogation), recently reaffirmed in
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct 2326,2333-34 (2000) (confirming that Miranda rule is
constitutionally based and that legislature cannot supercede it).
46. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84 (stating that restrictions on truthfulness of legal advertise-
ments do not discourage free speech); Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-73 (conclud-
ing that although state may regulate certain commercial speech, state may not prohibit distribu-
tion oftruthful communication based on potential effects on recipients).
47. For example, a Pfilosec commercial contained the following warning: "Prilosec is
generally well tolerated, but it is not for everybody. The most common side effects are head-
ache, diarrhea, and abdominal pain." Prilosec Commercial (NBC television broadcast, June 20,
2000). A Propecia commercial warned, "A small number of men experienced some sexual side
effects. Women who are or may potentially be pregnant must not use Propecia or handle broken
tablets." Propecia Commercial (TBS television broadcast, June 21,2000). A Claritin commer-
cial advised, "Claritin Reditabs are well tolerated, with a low occurrence of side effects. Side
effects include headache, drowsiness, fatigue, and dry mouth. See your doctor for more infor-
mation." Claritin Commercial (ABC television broadcast, June 20, 2000). Finally, a Valtrex
commercial cautioned, "Valtrex is intended for treatment of initial and recurrent genital herpes
in adults with normal immune systems. The most common side effects are generally mild and
include headache, nausea, diarrhea, and dizziness. See your doctor for more information about
prescribing Valtrem" Valtrex Commercial (ABC television broadcast, June 21, 2000).
48. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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newspaper to give a discredited candidate newspaper space to respond to the
paper's critique. 9 Second, and more pointedly, the Court in Wooley v. May-
nard ° ruled that the government cannot compel a person to support aproposi-
tion that he preferred not to support."1 Wooley involved an extraordinarily
passive form of support, that is, the display of a license plate with the insignia
"Live Free or Die."' 2 If such innocuous compelled support of a proposition
offends the First Amendment, surely a requirement that Prilosec spell out the
risk of its product causing diarrhea also should offend the First Amendment. 3
Of course, that is not the case because Prilosec's commercials are low
value speech, whereas Wooley's discomfort with New Hampshire's license
plate message implicates higher value political speech. Although both deserve
protection, it seems ludicrous to equate the two. Thus, through proper use of
the device of low value speech, the Court can ensure protection of consumers
without having to reduce political speech to the rules appropriate for commer-
cial hucksters.
2. Solicitation
The concept of low value speech has been especially prominent in the
lawyer solicitation cases. The first two, In re Primus"4 and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass 'n," form a wonderfully paired paradigm of the difference be-
tween high value political speech and low value commercial speech.56 Primus
solicited an unlawfully sterilized woman for free representation bythe ACLU.'
In contrast, Ohralik solicited a woman injured in an automobile accident
whom he hoped to represent for profit.5"
Unsurprisingly, the Court upheld Primus's First Amendment claim yet
rejected that of Ohralik 59 Pointedly rejecting the argument that there is one
49. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (emphasizing
editor's full discretion over material he publishes).
50. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
51. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,717 (1977) (concludingthat state cannotforce
individual to display state motto inconsistent with individual's beliefs).
52. Id. at 707.
53. See supra note 47 (listing television commercials' forced and explicit recitations of
products' side effects).
54. 436 U.S. 412(1978).
55. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
56. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (finding that First
Amendment does not protect attorney's solicitation for purpose ofpecuniary gain); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978) (determining that First Amendment protects non-profit organiza-
tion's communication of free legal assistance).
57. Pr'mus, 436 U.S. at 422.
58. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at450.
59. Ohrali, 436 U.S. at 468; Primus, 436 U.S. at 439.
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rule for all speech, the OhralikCourtnoted: "In-person solicitation by a lawyer
of remnmerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an
essential but subordinate component. While this does not remove the speech
from the protection ofthe First Amendment. .., it lowers the level of appropri-
ate judicial scrutiny. 60 Had the Court not adopted the high value/low value
dichotomy, it would have had to choose between denying First Amendment
protection to Primus' civil rights solicitation, or granting such protection to
Ohralik's ambulance chasing. Recognizing lowvalue speech allowed the Court
to do neither.6'
3. Time, Place, and Manner
Time, place, and manner (or when, where, and how) cases typically ad-
dress whether a court can sustain a speech-restrictive statute designed to pro-
tect some nonspeech interest (for example, visual blight). Even when high
value speech is implicated, these cases necessarily require balancing, some-
times favoring speech and sometimes favoring aesthetics. For example, in
Schneider v. State (Town oflrvington),62 the Court held that a state's interest
in preventing litter did not justify the prohibition of all leafleting.6' Some years
later, however, inMembers ofthe City Council ofLosAngeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent,' the Court upheld the City's aesthetic concerns in forbidding posters
on lampposts, notwithstanding the First Amendment costs.65
Because cases like these involve balancing, and because, by definition,
low value speech is not equal to high value speech, one would expect, at least
in some instances, that a court would sustain a time, place, and manner limita-
tion on commercial speech that it would not sustain ifthe speech was political
speech. Had Valentine v. Chrestensen arisen after Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy,' it could have been such an example. The Valentine Court might
60. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
61. See also Bd. of Trustees ofthe State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,485-86,474-
75 (1989) (upholding limits on solicitation for selling Tupperware that would not have been
appropriate for charitable solicitations, and contrasting case with Riley v. National Federation
of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (finding that Constitution pro-
tects commercial speech "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial speech)).
62. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
63. See Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147,162-64 (1939) (reasoning
that stated purpose of keeping streets clean does not justify restriction on speech).
64. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
65. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 803-05 (1984) (finding that city's prohibition on posting signs on public property does not
violate First Amendment).
66. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text In Chrestensen, the Court dismissed the
commercial handbills as no value speech. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942)
(discussed supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text).
67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
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have held that although commercial speech is important, its lesser value
allows the City's interest in clean streets to trump Chrestensen's free speech
claim. Of course, the Court also might have held that even with its lower
value, commercial speech is more important than the City's marginal gain in
street cleanliness achieved through its anti-leafleting ordinance. The point is
not the result of the balance. Rather, the point is that the balance between low
value speech and a time, place or manner regulation is not (or should not be)
the same as the balance between high value speech and the same time, place,
and manner regulation.'
One good illustration of this rule in operation was Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego,69 in which the Court confronted an anti-billboard ordi-
nance.70 InMetromedia, a plurality of four Justices concluded that a city may
limit billboards to on-site commercial advertising, but it may not so limit non-
commercial signs.71 Relying on the lower value of commercial speech, the
plurality reasoned that the City's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics out-
weighed the commercial free speech interest in off-site advertising.72 How-
ever, it also held that the higher value of noncommercial speech trumped the
City's interest."
3
Two Justices in Metromedia maintained that both commercial and non-
commercial speech should prevail. 4 The other three would have allowed
neither to prevail.!' Because one ofthe Justices, Rehnquist, (who voted to sus-
tain the statute for both types of speech) has consistently argued that com-
mercial speech is less valuable than other speech, 6 it seems fair to conclude
that at least five ofthe Justices onthe Metromedia Court would have held that
(1976); see supra text accompanying notes 18-21. In Virginia State BeL ofPharmacy, the Court
recognized the value of commercial speech and thus granted it more protection than the Court
in Chrestensen granted it. Va. State Rd ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73.
68. But see generally City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)
(discussed and critiqued infra text accompanying notes 102-08).
69. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
70. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-21 (1981) (White, 3.,
plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 512-13.
72. Id. at 512.
73. Id. at 514-15.
74. Id. at 521.40 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Blackmun joined the
concurrence.
75. Id. at 540-55 (Stevens, 3., dissenting in part); id. at 555-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 569-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410,439 (1993) (Rehn-
quist, CJ., dissenting) ("Our jurisprudence has emphasized that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm ofnoncommercial expression'" (quoting Bd. ofTrustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477 (1989))).
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the rights of commercial speakers should be balanced differently from, and less
favorably than, high value speakers when weighing their rights in regard to a
time, place or manner regulation.
B. Sexually Explicit Speech
1. Community Environment
At least since 1973, the Supreme Court has recognized the potential
connection between sexually explicit speech and neighborhood deterioration.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,77 the Court explained the rationale behind
anti-obscenity laws as the protection of "the quality of life and the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and,
possibly, the public safety itself.""8 Three years later, in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. 9 a sharply divided Court found that the concentration of
sexually explicit bookstores and movie theaters in the same area could com-
promise the quality of life in that neighborhood, regardless of whether the
material was obscene.80
Although only four of the Justices explicitly grounded their decision on
the "low value speech" theory, it seems hard to believe that the value of the
speech did not at least influence Justice Powell, the fifth vote.8 Justice Powell
believed that because only sexually explicit speech caused the problem of
neighborhood deterioration, there was no need to decentralize all movie
theaters and book stores. I have argued elsewhere that Justice Powell's opinion
would not permit a predominantly Republican town to forbid Democrats to set
up headquarters out of a concern that the riffraff attracted thereto would spoil
the town's genteel image.5 If I am correct in my analysis of the "Republican
town" case, apiece of Justice Powell's opinion must be predicated on the lower
value of sexually explicit speech.
Young is a marvelous compromise. While allowing sexually explicit
speech to be discriminated against in a manner that would ordinarily be intoler-
able under the First Amendment,83 the Court insisted that access to the material
77. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
78. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58 (1973).
79. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
80. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50,72 (1976).
81. See id. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring) (applying four-part test from United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968)).
82. See Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity, Pornography, andFirstAmendmentTheory, 2WM.
& MARY BMIL RTs. J. 471,489 (1993) (arguing that Republican and Democrat hypothetical was
more viewpoint-specific than ordinance in Young).
83. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
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should not be significantly limited." The Court noted the ample availability
of sexually explicit movies in Detroit.85 Thus, it was able to preserve both the
quality of Detroit's neighborhoods, and the availability of sexually explicit
material to those who desired it. By protecting the heart of both the city's and
the First Amendment's primary interest, Young stands as a paradigm for the
proper use of low value speech.
2. Children
The government frequently has invoked, but rarely succeeded with, argu-
ments designed to curb sexually explicit speech for the sake of the children.
Typically, the government has argued that unless certain sexually explicit
messages are forbidden, children may gain access to them. The vice of these
arguments is that they would severely limit adult access to material in order to
protect children. Thus, efforts to keep patent indecency off oftelephones"6 and
the Interet!' have failed. As Justice Frankfurter once put it, we cannot "re-
duce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children.""8
On the other hand, statutes that channel sexually explicit speech away
from children without significantly impairing adult access have fared better,
as they should. The best example is Ginsberg v. New York, 9 a case decided
before the rhetoric of low value speech entered the Supreme Court's lexicon.
Ginsberg upheld the conviction of a merchant who sold sexually explicit
magazines, deemed obscene for children, to a sixteen year old boy." The
Court emphasized that the statute did not impair adult access. 2 Indeed, it did
not even significantly impair a teenager's access if his parents approved.93
84. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (stating that "First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value").
85. See id. at 55 n.3 (citing police memo stating that number of adult theaters in Detroit
increased from two to twenty-five); id. at 71 n.35 (stating ordinance did not apply to existing
theaters).
86. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (invalidating
statute that banned adult access to indecent messages).
87. See Reno v.ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,885 (1997) (invalidating Communications Decency
Act of 1996).
88. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,383 (1957).
89. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
90. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (concluding that legislature
could punish sale of sexually-explicit material to minors even though material was not obscene
for adults).
91. Id. at 631-33.
92. Id. at 634-35.
93. "Moreover, the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire
from purchasing the magazines for their children." Id. at 639.
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FCC v. Pacifica Foundation94 was the one case in which a portion of the
Court specifically relied on the low value of sexually explicit speech to pro-
tect juveniles. In Pacifica, the Court upheld, as constitutionally appropriate,
the time channeling of a monologue that repeatedly invoked what the speaker,
George Carlin, called the "seven dirty words" that cannot be broadcast on the
airwaves.95 The three Justices that relied on low value speech and the two
in the majority that did not,' all focused on the exposure to children of a
broadcast at two o'clock on an October Tuesday afternoon. The Court sug-
gested that a late evening broadcast when fewer children were likely to be in
the audience might yield a different result."
Pacifica was, as it should have been, a close case. Unlike Ginsberg,
adults were inconvenienced in their access to the monologue. Nonetheless, if
the Court were right in its premise about the accessibility to children, its
conclusion to channel the material probably would have been correct. How-
ever, its premise may not have been correct. Most children are in school at two
o'clock on Tuesday afternoon. Only one person complained about the broad-
cast, and though he was traveling with his young son, he was not sufficiently
upset to turn it off.9 Consequently, one has to wonder whether any significant
number of children even heard the monologue. If they did not, Pacifica was
probably wrongly decided. If in fact there were a significant number ofpoten-
tially unsupervised children in the audience, then the argument for the low
value speech doctrine channeling the monologue to a different time would have
been more powerful.
3. Privacy
Certain sexually explicit images are sufficiently shocking that an indis-
criminate foisting of them on the public would likely not be sustained. For
example, it is highly unlikely that a sexually explicit billboard on an interstate
highway would receive First Amendment protection."° The only Supreme
Court case dealing with the issue was Pacifica, in which the Court relied on
94. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
95. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,729 (1978).
96. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger relied on low value speech.
Id. at 744-48.
97. Justices Powell and Blackmun did not rely on low value speech. Id. at 761-62
(Powell, J., concurring).
98. M at750-51.
99. See LAURENCE R. TRIBE, AMmEIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 938 (2d ed. 1988)
(examining probability of offending any significant number of listeners).
100. But cf Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (invalidating
ordinance that forbade projection of nude images from drive-in theater).
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the intrusion of radio into the private home.' Frankly, to distinguish the case
on the radio's intrusiveness seems tenuous at best. First, a simple turn ofthe
tuning knob or push ofthe off button can adequately protect privacy. Second,
if that were not sufficient, how could we justify the portion of Pacifica that
suggested the appropriateness of a late night airing? Presumably, people are
even more likely to be at home late at night. Thus, if privacy were truly the
basis of Pacifica, it is unlikely that the Court would have incorporated the late
night suggestion into the opinion.
IV. The Nonuse of Low Value Speech
A. Commercial Speech
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,1' 2 the Court clearly
rejected the time, place, and manner analysis proposed in Part III.A.3 of this
Article and suggested by the Metromedia plurality. 3 Discovery involved a
Cincinnati ordinance designed to improve safety and aesthetics by eliminating
commercial newspaper boxes from public right of ways." 4 Because only
sixty-two ofthe 1500-2000 newspaper boxes were commercial, most newspa-
per boxes were unaffected by the ordinance." s
In invalidating the ordinance, the Court rejected the argument that com-
mercial speech could be treated as less valuable than other speech."° Noting
that the hazardous nature or ugliness of a newspaper box did not depend on
the commercial vis- a-vis noncommercial character, the Court held that reli-
ance on commercial content was a forbidden content-based discrimination."
The low value character of commercial speech was simply not relevant to the
manner of its distribution." The Court may have reached the correct result
because the paltry number of newspaper boxes eliminated was such a small
percentage of the total that it may not have been worth even the low value
speech candle. Unfortunately, by denigrating the low value characterization
in reaching its arguably correct result, the Court may have unnecessarily
blurred the line between low value and high value speech.
101. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (noting that offensive radio
material confronts citizen in privacy of own home).
102. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
103. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,516-17 (1981) (analyzing
restrictions in time, place, and manner context); see also supra text accompanying notes 69-76
(discussing Metromedia).
104. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,413 (1993).
105. Id. at 418.
106. Id. at418-19.
107. Id. at 427-28.
108. Id. at 426.
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B. Sexually Explicit Speech
Not unlike in its Discovery opinion, the Court in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc."° disparaged the difference between a burden and
a complete prohibition as applied to low value speech.11 Playboy involved
a federal statute exclusively applicable to sexually explicit channels."' It re-
quired such channels either to block completely the signal for nonsubscribers
or to limit broadcast to the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m." 2 Incomplete
blocking that resulted in "signal bleed," whereby some of the audio or video
still could be seen or heard, was not sufficient." 3 Playboy argued, and the
Court agreed, that providing complete blocking for only those cable subscrib-
ers that requested it would be a less intrusive alternative.'
Playboy was not an altogether problematic opinion. The entire Court
agreed that purveyors of sexually explicit material could be required to pay for
extra blocking that was not required for other channels." 5 Furthermore,
because any homeowner who desired complete blocking could have it, no
parent desiring protection, nor cable subscriber desiring privacy, need be sub-
ject to invasion. On the other hand, the record did identify substantial evi-
dence that obtaining blocking was neither as efficient or expeditious as might
be desired, and that children were sometimes exposed to Playboy's partially
scrambled signal outside of their parents' home." 6
Significantly, the court never analyzed, presumably because it thought it
irrelevant, how little the willing listener would be inconvenienced by the 10
p.m. to 6 a.m. alternative. One can assume that most people who have cable,
and who would choose to add the cost of Playboy, have a VCR. Consequently,
109. 120 S. Ct 1878 (2000).
110. See United Statesv. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878,1893(2000).
111. Id. at 1883-84.
112. Id. at 1882-83.
113. Id. at 1883.
114. Id. at 1888-93.
115. Id. at 1888. The dispute was over whether such blocking should be required in the
absence of a request from a customer.
116. There were instances, noted in the record, of customers having blocking difficulties.
In fact, it was conceded by Playboy that the basic scrambling package did not scramble the
audio portion of the program. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702,
707 (D. Del. 1998). Also, the Government presented at least three witnesses that complained
of the ineffectiveness of the partial scrambling. Louisa Lindell of Wilmington, Delaware testi-
fied that her son viewed signal bleed at friend's house, Phil Vonder Haar of Webster Groves,
Missouri testified that he viewed signal bleed at his daughter's home in St Louis; and Cecilia
Flake of Battle Creek, Michigan, was informed that she would be charged $6.00 to have her
signal blocked. Id. at 709 n.10; see also 141 CoNG. REc. 15586 (1995) (providing further testi-
mony about signal bleed).
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the viewer desiring to watch Playboy during early evening hours could record
the program the night before and watch it the next evening. Surely there is
little, if anything, that is so time sensitive in Playboy's offerings that a day's
delay would be problematic."' In this regard, the Playboy statute actually
interfered less with the listener than the FCC order upheld in Pacifica. The
driver of a car likely would not be prepared to record George Carlin's mono-
logue from the radio because he would not know when it might appear.
Of course, Playboy would not earn as much money if it were limited to
eight non-primetime hours. However, while profit to the speaker does not
deprive speech of First Amendment value,"' neither does it drive the law.
Our primary First amendment concern is ensuring the speaker's access to the
audience, and the audience's access to the speech." 9
V The Misuse of Low Value Speech
Using the low value speech concept to totally suppress unpopular speech
should be immediately rethought. In this Part, I identify two instances in
which the low value speech concept has been used as an improper excuse for
total suppression.
A. Commercial Speech
The chief culprit is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission,120 in which the Court claimed, quite wrongly,' 2 1 that prior
commercial speech cases had developed the following four part test:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least
must concernlawful activityandnotbe misleading. Next, we askwhether
theassertedgovernmentalinterestis substantial. Ifbothinquiriesyieldposi-
tive answers, we must determine whetherthe regulation directly advances
117. I suppose it is theoretically possible that some individual would wish to watch more
than eight hours of Playboy per day, but in the absence of proof that there are very many such
individuals, we should not be terribly concerned about it.
118. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (concluding that economic interest does not disqualify speech from First Amend-
ment protection); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,266 (1964) (stating that paid
nature of advertisement was irrelevant); see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)
(sale of books for profit); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (distribu-
tion of movies for profit).
119. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,76-79 (1976) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (stating that First Amendment requires full opportunity for expression and full oppor-
tunity for everyone to receive message).
120. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
121. See generallyLinmarkAssocs., Inc. v. Township of Wdlingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(discussed infra notes 130-34).
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thegovernmentalinterestasserted, andwhetheritisnotmore extensivethan
is necessary to serve that interest."
The deceptive simplicity ofthe test masks its anti-First Amendment character.
In form, it looks like O'Brien warmed over."z In substance, it allows govern-
ment to suppress a message to avoid the harm of its being conveyed, which is
in direct contravention of one of the Court's most crucial First Amendment
rules: "There is no such thing as a false idea."'24
CentralHudson involved a Commission ban on all promotional advertis-
ing by electric utility companies including advertisements advocating products
to conserve electrical energy." The Court reasoned that this conservation
rationale was a legitimate purpose, and that if the promotional ban simply
applied to products that used more energy, the ban would have been constitu-
tional. 1'26 However, because the ban also applied to products such as heat
pumps, that would use energy more efficiently, the ban was more extensive
than necessary, thus failing the fourth part of the test."
Central Hudson is a watershed case because it marks the first time in
nearly half a century that the Court suggested that mere advocacy of an anti-
government policy could be grounds for suppression." Railing against the
Court's test, Justice Blackmun observed:
I seriously doubt whether suppression ofinformation concerningthe avail-
ability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for
the State to "dampen" demand for or use of the product. Even though
"commercial" speech is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the
heart of the First Amendment 2
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980)
(emphasis added).
123. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court announced a four part
test to determine when conduct designed to express an idea was constitutionally protected:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest
Id. at 377.
124. Gerlz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339 (1974).
125. Cent Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559.
126. Id. at 568-69.
127. Id. at 570.
128. Even the Court inDennisv. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), at least required that
"the gravity of the 'evil' [be] discounted by its improbability" before speech could be suppressed.
Id. at 510. The last case to uphold a conviction predicated on mere advocacy was Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
129. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Ironically, justthree years earlierinLinmarkAssociates, Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro,"' a unanimous Supreme Court13 had resoundingly rejected
any such theory for commercial speech."2 At issue was a town ordinance
precluding the display of "for sale" signs on front lawns, predicated on the
perceived fear that such signs would accelerate the already serious problem
of-white flight.'" Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall (who inexplicably
joined the Central Hudson majority) correctly observed:
The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears
that otherwise homeowners willmake decisions inimical to what the council
views as the homeowners' self interest and the corporate interest ofthe town-
ship: they will choose to leave town... If dissemination of this information
-canbe restricted, then every locality inthe country can suppress any facts that
reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible claim can be made that
disclosure would causethe recipients ofthe informationto act "irrationally."'"
That the Court could ignore such obvious constitutional wisdom, only three
years after pronouncing it, is part of the shame of Central Hudson. More dis-
appointing are two of Central Hudson's more pernicious progeny, Posadas
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. ofPuerto Rico135 and United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co.,136 in which the Court actually upheld statutes de-
signed to limit commercial speech in order to maximize public ignorance. 37
The Posadas Court upheld a Puerto Rican statute designed to forbid local
casino gambling advertising in order to reduce local demand. 38 Relying on
Puerto Rico's undoubted power to forbid gambling casinos entirely, the Court
held that Puerto Rico necessarily possessed the "lesser" power to preclude
advertising of casinos.'39 Relying on Central Hudson, the Court found that
preventing advertising directly advanced the government's interest and was
no more extensive than necessary."4° Fortunately, more recent cases have
indicated that '"he greater includes the lesser" rationale is no longer to be
followed and that Posadas likely is no longer good law. 4'
130. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
131. Justice Rehnquist did not participate.
132. LinmarkAssocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,95 (1977).
133. Id. at 87-91.
134. Id. at 96.
135. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
136. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
137. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428-35 (1993); Posadas P.R. Assocs.
v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,341-46 (1986).
138. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332-33.
139. Id. at 346.
140. Id. at 341-44.
141. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-510 (1996) (majority
opinion written by Justice Stevens and joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Gins-
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The demise of Edge, however, is not so clear. Edge involved a federal
statute forbidding gambling advertising by radio stations licensed by states in
which lotteries were unlawful. 42 Edge owned a radio station in a non-lottery
state, North Carolina, but broadcast into a lottery state, Virginia, where over
ninety percent of its audience resided.14  A federal statute precluded radio
stations in non-lottery states from accepting lottery advertising.44 The theoret-
ical federal interest was a desire to balance the competing rights of the states
with lotteries against the rights of the states without them. 4 The Court con-
cluded that the advertising ban on North Carolina stations, including this one
whose audience was primarily Virginian, directly advanced that governmental
interest.146
The Court never analyzed why, or even whether, North Carolina had an
interest in precluding its citizens from playing the Virginia lottery. It is not a
violation of North Carolina law for a North Carolinian to buy a Virginia lottery
ticket and to transport it to North Carolina. 47 Indeed, it is doubtful whether
North Carolina could criminalize the transportation of a lottery ticket lawfully
purchased in Virginia.141 Under similar circumstances, the Court, even before
it had held commercial speech to be entitled to some First Amendment protec-
burg, J.J.) ( "[O]n reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas erroneously performed the
First Amendment analysis.... The Posadas majority's conclusion on that point cannot be
reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on
truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speech-related alternatives were available."); see
also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,182 (1999) (noting that
"the opinions in [44 Liquormart] concluded that our precedent both preceding and following
Posadas had applied the Central Hudson test more strictly. . . - and... we had rejected the
argument that the power to restrict speech about certain socially harmful activities was as broad
as the power to prohibit such conduct") (citations omitted).
142. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,422-23 (1993).
143. Id. at423.
144. Id. at 424.
145. Id. at 426.
146. Id. at428. The result in Edge probably would be different today because the Court
seems to demand a closer fit between the means and the end. See Greater New Orleans, 527
U.S. at 188-95 (requiring narrow tailoring of restrictions). Unfortunately, the Court still asks
the same questions.
147. Indeed, it has not been illegal since 1876, when the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that its anti-lottery statute did not apply to purchasers of out-of-state lottery tickets. See
State v. Bryant, 74 N.C. 207,209 (1876).
148. See Edge, 509 U.S. at437 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("North Carolina law does not,
and presumably couldn't, bar its citizens from travelling across the state line and participating
in the Virginia lottery."); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978)
(holding that New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of most solid or liquid waste was
unconstitutional); Baldwin v. GA.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (invalidating New
York Milk Control Act that set minimum prices to be paid by dealers to producers for milk, and
prohibited sale of milk brought from outside state of New York unless price would be same as
price paid for milk produced in state).
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 195 (2001)
tion, in Bigelow v. Virginia,49 invalidated a Virginia law forbidding advertis-
ing the availability of abortions, as applied to a newspaper that advertised
lawful abortions in New York.150
The similarities of the cases are strildng. Bigelow advertised lawful
abortions in New York at a time when abortions were not constitutionally pro-
tected, and when they were deemed both unlawful and immoral in Virginia.'
The federal government sought to do for North Carolinians in Edge52 what
Virginia's legislature sought to do for Virginians in Bigelow. The Court in
Edge would have done well to share the Bigelow Court's understanding of the
constitutional insubstantiality of that interest:
Here, Virginia is really asserting aninterest in regulating what Virginians
may hear or read about the New York services. It is, in effect, advancing
aninterestin shielding its citizens frominformationaboutactivities outside
Virginia's borders, activities that Virginia's police powers do not reach.
The asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, if any,
weight under the circumstances1
53
Ironically, Edge was decided only three months after Discovery,' S which,
as we have seen, refused to allow low value commercial speech to be treated
less favorably than political speech in regard to a time, place, and manner
regulation. So, within three months, the Court went from insisting on treating
all speech equally for a time, place, and manner regulation to upholding a
clearly viewpoint based statute, intentionally designed to keep ideas from the
populace. The Court can, and frankly should, do better.
Before closing this section, I would be remiss if I did not commend one
Justice who is trying to fixthe CentralHudson mess. Justice Thomas recently
condemned that portion of Central Hudson that allows the state's interest in
shielding its citizens from hearing what the state does not want them to hear
to count as a constitutionally cognizable interest.155 Although he contributed
149. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
150. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (stating that statute would impose
severe burdens on interstate publications).
151. See id. at 811-15 (discussing nature of advertisement). The Bigelow advertisement
that violated Virginia law ran in 1972, beforeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (examining congressional limitations
on lottery advertisement).
153. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827-28 (second emphasis added).
154. See supra Part IVA and accompanying text (discussing treatment of low value
commercial speech).
155. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1984) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring injudgment). Justice Thomas remarked:
[When] the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balano-
THE USE, NONUSE, AND MISUSE OFLOW VALUE SPEECH
to the problem by joining the majority in Edge, he does seem to be trying to
atone for his indiscretion."s6 If he can persuade four of his colleagues to join
him, the mess will be fixed.
B. Sexually Explicit Speech
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc."7 is the Central Hudson of
sexually explicit speech. 58 Relying on the wonderfully nuanced Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.5 9 a case that allowed zoning of sexually explicit
theaters as long as the availability of such material was not significantly im-
paired,"6 Renton transmogrified the Young doctrine into one in which avail-
ability of the material was irrelevant. On the surface, the Renton ordinance
resembled that upheld in Young- both were zoning laws. In form, the Young
ordinance called for dispersal of sexually explicit theaters (no more than two
within 1000 feet of each other)'61 while the Renton ordinance suggested con-
centration (none within 1000 feet of a residential neighborhood, church, park,
or school). 62 However, there was one huge difference. The Young ordinance
did not significantly reduce adult access to the material, whereas the Renton
ordinance did reduce adult access.
ing test adopted in CentralHudson should not be applied, in my view. Rather, such
an "interest" is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of "commer-
cial" speech than it can justify regulation of"noncommercial" speech.
Id.
156. Somewhat inexplicably, in his concurring opinion in Liquormart, Justice Thomas
stopped short of disowning Edge, although he clearly indicated that it needed to be rethought.
However, his opinions in both 44 Liquorrart and Greater New Orleans are flatly inconsistent
with not only Central Hudson, but also with Edge. Justice Thomas wrote:
The outcome in Edge may well be in conflict with the principles espoused in Vir-
ginia Rd. of Pharmacy and ratified by me today... Because the issue of restric-
tions on advertising of products or services to be purchased legally outside a State
that has itself banned or regulated the same purchases within the State is not
squarely presented in this case, I will not address here whether the decision in Edge
can be reconciled with the position I take today.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 526 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
157. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
158. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (upholding
constitutionality of zoning ordinance prohibiting adult theaters).
159. 427 U.S. 50(1976).
160. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing permissibility of zoning
ordinances).
161. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50,50 (1976).
162. Renton, 475 U.S. at 926.
217
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 195 (2001)
Although the Renton ordinance formally allowed sexually explicit enter-
tainment in areas that were not within 1000 feet of a residence, church, park,
or school, that restriction left available only 520 acres, or just over five
percent of the City. 63 Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit had observed in
invalidating this ordinance, most of this land was unfit or unavailable for use
as an adult movie theater."6 One may assume that Renton was not bothered
by the total absence of adult movie theaters within its borders. Neither was
the Supreme Court, which rather cavalierly concluded:
That respondents must fend forthemselves inthe real estate market, on an
equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give
rise to aFirstAmendmentviolation.... Inourview, the First Amendment
requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying respondents a
reasonable opportunityto open and operate anadulttheater withinthe city,
and the ordinance before us easily meets this requirement. 5
Unfortunately, the Court was neither legally nor factually correct. The law
did not allow respondents to compete on an equal footing, but rather subjected
them to a law unto themselves. Consequently, they did not have a reasonable
opportunity to open a theater unless the word "reasonable" is used in some
kind of Alice in Wonderland sense."
At least the Renton Court formally required that the sexually explicit
entertainment have a chance to compete. The Court dropped even that fig
leaf167 in the nude dancing cases, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.16l and City of
163. Justice Rehnquist described the area as "more than 5%." Id. at 53. I presume that if
it were significantly more than 5% (say, 10%), he would have said so.
164. The Ninth Circuit appropriately noted:
The district court found that 520 acres in Renton were available for adult theater
sites. Although we do not quarrel with the conclusion that 520 acres are outside the
restricted zone, we do not agree that the land is available. A substantial part of the
520 acres is occupied by.
(1) a sewage disposal site and treatment plant;
(2) a horseracing track and environs,
(3) a business park containing buildings suitable only for industrial use;
(4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities;
(5) a Mobil Oil tank farm; and,
(6) a fully-developed shopping center.
Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527,534 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Loewy,
supra note 82, at 491-93 (comparing Renton and Young).
165. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54.
166. Humpty Dumpty told Alice, "When I use a word... it means what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less." LEWIS CARROlL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LOOKnG GLASS 216 (1957).
167. Or perhaps I should say, "g-string."
168. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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Erie v. Pap's A.M 69 Barnes, to put it mildly, was a strange case. Three of
the Justices, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Kennedy, conceded that nude dancing
was speech, albeit low value speech."' However, they still concluded that the
immorality of public nudity was sufficient to warrant its total prohibition.'
Obviously, something is wrong here. If speech is protected, even low value
speech, it cannot be precluded simply because it is immoral. That would
reduce it to "no value" speech, which the Court claimed not to be doing.
Probably because of the obvious silliness of that rationale, the Court dropped
it nine years later in Pap's.
17 2
Justice Scalia's rationale in Barnes was simpler. In his view, all public
nudity was forbidden. Therefore public nude dancing could also be forbid-
den.' 3 If his major premise, which is that all public nudity could be forbid-
den, were correct, his conclusion would make perfect sense. Unfortunately
(or perhaps fortunately) that is not correct. Several decisions have held that
nudity is not a justification for suppressing movies"1 4 or plays, 175 and Indiana
never claimed that its statute forbade them. 6 Consequently, it is simply not
true that Indiana had forbidden all public nudity.
Justice Souter (the fifth vote) relied on the negative secondary effects
caused by nude dancing, 17 a rationale that later commanded a plurality of the
Court in Pap's.173 At least two problems inhere in that analysis. First, no
evidence was presented as to any problems occasioned by nude dancing, nor
169. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
170. They found nude dancing to be "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters ofthe
first Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so." Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
171. Id.at571-72.
172. City of Erie v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277, 290-92 (2000) (discussing analysis in
Barnes).
173. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572-81 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that it is our nation's
tradition that people should not expose themselves).
174. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) (striking ordi-
nance prohibiting films with nudity at drive-in theater); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161
(1974) (concluding that nudity does not render movie obscene).
175. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (finding
that municipality's refusal to rent auditorium for allegedly vulgar production was unconstitu-
tional prior restraint).
176. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,590 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
state's argument that it did not seek to prohibit nudity if it were part of form of expression
"meriting protection").
177. Id. at 585 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that pernicious secondary effects may be
associated with nude dancing).
178. Erie v. Pap's AM., 529 U.S. 277, 296-99 (2000) (finding secondary effects sufficient
in determining public health and safety interest).
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is it intuitively obvious that totally nude dancers are more likely to cause
social problems for the city than erotic dancers with a modicum of clothing
(pasties and g-string) would cause." 9 Indeed, in Pap's, Justice Souter re-
thought his Barnes opinion and voted to remand for a determination of ad-
verse secondary effects. s°
The second, and more serious, objection to the secondary effects ratio-
nale is that the ordinance applies to all nude dancing. Consequently, whether
Pap's or any other establishment in fact created adverse secondary effects was
immaterial."' No other case, including Renton, had ever held that the govern-
ment can bar all sexually explicit entertainment because of a potential nega-
tive secondary effect. Such a holding, subtly but completely, transmogrifies
low value speech into no value speech or nonspeech.
I am not arguing that the harmful secondary effects from nude dancing
cannot or should not be regulated. A state or municipality is free to enact
legislation forbidding alcohol at establishments that permit nude dancing. The
"sex and liquor do not mix" rationale has been the law at least since 1972."
Reasonable distance requirements between dancers and audience is another
possibility." Finally, such establishments could be zoned to such areas
where they are less likely to cause adverse secondary effects.'84
Ironically, Pap's was decided less than two months before Playboy, in
which the Court had refused to allow channeling or blocking of movies con-
sisting of a lot more than nude dancing." 5 This is not a consistent or proper
use of low value speech. If the speech is low value, it should be subject to
reasonable channeling; it should not be subject to total prohibition.
179. Indeed, it is not uncommon for sex shops to sell pasties and g-strings to individuals
who wish to be more sexually provocative. See ADAM & EVE, WoID's LUCKIEST PATiENT 2,
4,12 (2000); FREDmRIC 's OF HoLLYWooD, BEST OF THE BEST 23,29 (2000).
180. See Pap's, 529 U.S. at 312-13 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing need for evidentiary record). In an opinion concurring in the Pap's judgment,
Justice Scalia (this time joined by Justice Thomas) repeated his Barnes analysis, concluding that
a general law against public nudity does not violate the First Amendment, oven as applied to
nude dancing. Id. at 307-08.
181. This probably explains why the record was silent on the subject.
182. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972) (upholding regulation banning
nude entertainment in places that sold liquor).
183. Justice Scalia's opinion notwithstanding, this case was not about lap dancing. See
Pap's, 529 U.S. at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that city's concern was with lap dancers,
as opposed to streakers, sunbathers, or hot dog vendors); see also id. at 1406 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that case was not about lap dancing).
184. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (upholding such
zoning); supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing zoning ordinances).
185. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Playboy
Entr 't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878 (2000).
THE USE, NONUSE, AND MISUSE OFLO W VALUE SPEECH 221
V. Rethinking Obscenity as Low Value Speech
More than thirty years ago, before the Court even verbalized the "low
value" speech doctrine, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia"s 6 held that while the
dissemination of obscenity was subject to regulation, the private consumption
of it could not be so regulated."s In ringing tones, the Court eloquently pro-
nounced:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films hemaywatch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government power to control men's minds....
Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas
inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legisla-
tion on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."
The Court then noted that public distribution of obscenity presented different
problems such as the danger of children obtaining the material and the intru-
sion of the material on the general public."9 Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, also could have noted the community environment issue, later devel-
oped in Paris Adult Theatre."9
Although subsequent cases have reduced Stanley to such a minute blip
on the Court's obscenity radar screen 91 that Justice Black lamented, "[Iun the
future that case will be recognized as good law only when a man writes sala-
186. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
187. Stanley v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
188. Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 567 (distinguishing public distribution of obscene materials).
190. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, articulated that
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming
the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effec-
tive safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby... These include
the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment,
the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself.
Id. at 58; see also supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (discussing Slaton).
191. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139,144 (1973) (holding that First Amendment
right to possess obscene material in privacy of one's home does not create right to transport
such material, as applied to person transporting film in briefcase or on interstate flight); United
States v. 12,200-Ft Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1973) (finding that
government can constitutionally prohibit importation of obscene material even though importer
claimed that such material was for private, personal use); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (holding that Tariff Act of 1930 could be constitutionally
applied to seizure of allegedly obscene photographs if certain procedural safeguards were read
into statute); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (upholding section of United
States Code prohibiting knowing use of mails for delivery of obscene materials).
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cious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and reads them in his
living room," 92 the case should be revived as a serious first step towards
treating obscenity as low value speech. The current treatment of obscenity is
both overinclusive and underinclusive. Sexually explicit materials which are
not obscene can do the same type of harm as obscenity when marketed to
children, thrust in the face of unwilling viewers, and displayed in such a con-
centrated manner as to destroy a neighborhood. On the other hand, obscene
sexually explicit material that is discreetly marketed to consenting adults can
do nothing that can constitutionally count as harm."
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion inthe Playboy case' illustrates the
ill fit between the law and both governmental and First Amendment needs.
After noting that the government failed to argue that Playboy's programming
was obscene, and further noting that much of the programming may well have
been obscene, Justice Thomas concluded that the government's argument for
channeling the time, or effectively blocking the signal, of Playboy's con-
cededly indecent programming was unconstitutional:
I am unwilling to corrupt the First Amendment to [uphold the statute as a
proper regulation of protected (rather than unprotected) speech]. The
"starch!' in our constitutional standards cannot be sacrificed to accommo-
date the enforcement choices of the Government.l"
Under this all or nothing approach, indecent sexually explicit movies are
available for everybody, whether they like it or not, but obscene sexually ex-
plicit movies are available to nobody. Surely, the government should not be
forced to prohibit speech when it merely desires to regulate it.
Let us assess why the government did not try to establish the obscenity
of Playboy's movies. One possible reason is that, unlike the Burger" and
Rehnquistl Courts, the government took seriously the Stanley admonition
that "it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of con-
trolling a person's private thoughts."'" A more practical reason is the diffi-
culty and uncertainty of obtaining an obscenity verdict.
192. Thiroeven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 382.
193. The Court in Stanley was quite correct in holding that the content of one's mind can-
not constitutionally count as harm. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (stating
that mind is not subject to state control).
194. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1894-95 (2000); see
also supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text (discussing Playboy case).
195. Playboy, 120 S. Ct. at 1895 (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (upholding concept of
obscenity).
197. See, e.g., Pope v. illinois, 481 U.S. 497,504 (1987) (upholding obscenity conviction
oftwo bookstore clerks).
198. Stanley v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 557,566 (1969).
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Justice Scalia described the promotion for one of Playboy's movies as
follows: "Little miss country girls are aching for a quick roll in the hay! Watch
southern hospitality pull out all the stops as those ravin' nymphos tear down
the barn and light up the big country sky."'" Let us assume that the govern-
ment chose to prosecute Playboy for showing that movie. Playboy, undoubt-
edly equipped with the best obscenity lawyers available, would argue that the
movie was of high artistic value because ofthe camera angles. It would prob-
ably also argue that there was a moral to the story.2"c Playboy might further
contend that the focus on country girls was a political satire, debunking the
idea that rural America is inferior to its urban compatriots. Finally, it would
argue that the movie is no more offensive than dozens of other movies shown
on cable channels such as HBO, Cinemax, or Showtime.
To make its case, the government would undoubtedly show the movie to
ordinary citizens, who might be horrified by its content, in order to obtain
them as witnesses. °1 The prosecutor would then challenge all of Playboy's
arguments for artistic or political merit with its own witnesses. Several days
later, the case would go to a jury which, if all twelve jurors found the movie
obscene beyond a reasonable doubt, could convict. Then the appellate process
would begin and several years later, if the Supreme Court affirmed or denied
certiorari, the conviction would be upheld. The conviction, of course, would
do nothing to keep Playboy from disseminating the rest of its movies, or, for
that matter, even the same movie, albeit in another community. °
Taking the concept of low value speech seriously, and including obscen-
ity within it, would avoid these problems.2 3 Instead of lengthy trials designed
199. Playboy, 120 S. Ct. at 1897.
200. Cf. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413,433-41 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) (appendix) (recounting minister's
sermon that characterized Fanny Hill as piece of moral literature).
201. See, e.g., BriefforAppellee at 8-9, Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (No. 293)
(calling the following individuals as government witnesses to testify as to obscenity: pastor who
was also Chairman of State Literature Commission; service station attendant; attorney, retired
locomotive engineer, optometrist; real estate salesman; assistant solicitor general; and investiga-
tor). These witnesses were all required to watch Stanley's film in order to determine whether
the film that he had in a drawer in his bedroom was obscene.
202. Community standards do vary.
203. Justice Scalia would avoid these problems by prosecuting Playboy on the basis of its
purveying predominantly sexually explicit material.
We are more permissive of government regulation in these circumstances because
it is clear from the context in which exchanges between such businesses and their
customers occur that neither the merchant nor the buyer is interested in the work's
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. "The deliberate representation of
petitioner's publications as erotically arousing... stimulates the reader to accept
them as prurient; he looks for titillation, not for saving intellectual content." Thus,
a business that "(1) offers ... hardcore sexual material, (2) as a constant and
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 195 (2001)
to determine whether a particular indecent movie is obscene, the government
could take steps to avoid the harms that it can legitimately prevent while
insuring that consenting adults have access to whatever reading and viewing
material they desire.2
VH. Explicit Violence as Low Value Speech
Just as my proposal would raise obscenity from no value to low value
speech, I would also suggest reducing explicit violence from high value to low
value speech. Recognizing that low value speech, properly conceived, will
not significantly interfere with a producer's opportunity to market the mate-
rial, or with a consumer's opportunity to obtain the material, it makes sense
to shield children and nonconsenting adults from this material. Violent
material foisted upon a nonconsenting adult may be as offensive as sexually
explicit material. And, it is at least doubtful that children are better served by
watching The Texas Chainsaw Massacre than Debbie Does Dallas."'
Pop culture has already recognized the similarity of inappropriateness
between violence and sex. Movies are frequently rated "R" for violence, and
occasionally even NC- 17."2°6 As long as low value speech is defined as I have
suggested, I see no harm, and some good, in creating a congruence between
explicitly sexual material and explicitly violent material.
intentional objective of [its] business, [and] (3) seeks to promote it as such' finds
no sanctuary in the First Amendment"
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878,1896 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissent-
lg) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,470 (1966)). Justice Scalia would apply
this same rationale to book stores. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 260-61 (1990)
(stating that emphasis should be on nature of business). In his view, a sexually explicit book
sold by Barnes and Noble is non-problematic, but many sexually explicit books sold by the
XXX Bookstore are a problem, and thus the XXX Bookstore should be subject to prosecution.
If this view were to prevail, constitutionally protected sexually explicit material would either
move to legitimate book stores where it would be much more likely to be perused by children
and nonconsenting adults, or it would disappear for want of a purveyor, thereby artificially
depriving some constitutionally protected material of a distributional outlet
204. This is not true when the case involves actual photographs of child pornography
because protection of the photographed child trumps any right to possess the material. See
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990) (finding that state's interest limits First Amend-
ment protection of child pornography); Loewy, supra note 82, at 480-82 (discussing First
Amendment protection of child pornography).
205. SeegeneralyKEVINW.SAUNDERS,VIOLENCEASOBScE=nY: LIM1T]NGThBMEDi'S
FIRSTAMENDMBNT PROTECTION 10-11 (1996) (discussing public debate over media violence).
206. Among those movies rated NC-17 for violence were: Man Bites Dog (Roxie Re-
leasing 1992) (Belgian film released in United States that was originally entitled C'estArrivid
Pri~s de Chez Vous) and Santa Sangre (Expanded Entm't 1991) (horror film with many scenes
of graphic violence).
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Viii Conclusion
Low value speech, properly conceived, provides an important detente for
utterances that are worthy of some constitutional protection, but are not the
functional equivalent of full value political speech. To be sure, the concept's
primary value is as a heuristic device designed to ensure that some types of
speech will get the protection they need without disabling the government
from enacting regulations that it needs to implement. But heuristic devices are
frequently necessary to ensure desired results,2" and low value speech ensures
results in accord with core constitutional principles. Stripped of its misuses,
low value speech should be celebrated as a means to protect both free speech
and society.
207. Obscenity is a heuristic device that yields an undesirable result. Arguably, so are "fight-
ingwords." Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (concluding
that words that inflict injury or tend to incite immediate breach of peace are outside scope of
First Amendment) with Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (limiting fighting words
doctrine to those words that have direct tendency to cause act of violence by person to whom
words are addressed). See also Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Speech From Conduct, 45
MERCER L. REV. 621,627-29 (1994) (discussing evolution offighting words doctrine).

